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WHY LIBERALISM PERSISTS: THE
NEGLECTED LIFE OF THE LAW IN THE
STORY OF LIBERALISM’S DECLINE
KENNETH L. TOWNSEND†
I. INTRODUCTION
Liberalism is in decline in the West. Past political divides that
pitted classically liberal conservatives against moderate to progressive political liberals are giving way to a new landscape in
which a liberal consensus simply cannot be assumed. From the
left, socialist and identity-based critiques of liberalism have called
into question core liberal assumptions regarding procedural justice, the division between public and private realms, and the rights
of individuals.1 From the right, an increasingly vocal group of
conservatives is questioning classical liberalism’s commitment to
limited government, a free market, and individual rights in favor
of a vision of political community where the state advances certain
religious, traditional, or nationalist views.2
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1
See, e.g., Nancy Fraser, From Progressive Neoliberalism to Trump—and Beyond,
AM. AFFS. (Nov. 2017), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/11/progressiveneoliberalism-trump-beyond/ [https://perma.cc/U3HK-Y295]; Francis Wade, “The
Liberal Order Is the Incubator for Authoritarianism”: A Conversation with Pankaj
Mishra, L.A. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 15, 2018), https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/theliberal-order-is-the-incubator-for-authoritarianism-a-conversation-with-pankaj-mishra/
[https://perma.cc/HQ4W-6L23].
2
See, e.g., PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED (2019); Sohrab Ahmari
et al., Against the Dead Consensus, FIRST THINGS (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www
.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/03/against-the-dead-consensus [https://perma.cc/
8SJ9-ZS52]; Adrian Vermeule, A Christian Strategy, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 2017),
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/11/a-christian-strategy [https://perma.cc/N4YAJWTP].
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Liberalism is in trouble then, but is it dying?3 The answer is
yes, according to a number of recent critiques from the so-called
“post-fusionist” right—a collection of thinkers who resist the “long
‘fusion’ that has defined conservatism since the Reagan era,
between social traditionalists and economic free-marketers.”4 Notable among their ranks is Notre Dame political theorist Patrick
Deneen, whose postmortem of liberalism, Why Liberalism Failed,
has captured the energies and anxieties of the age in a manner
rare for a work in legal or political theory.5
“Liberalism has failed,” according to Deneen, in characteristically dramatic fashion,
not because it fell short, but because it was true to itself. It has
failed because it has succeeded. As liberalism has “become more
fully itself,” as its inner logic has become more evident and its
self-contradictions manifest, it has generated pathologies that
are at once deformations of its claims yet realizations of liberal
ideology.6

3

See Zack Beauchamp, The Anti-Liberal Moment, VOX (Sept. 9, 2019, 8:20 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/9/20750160/liberalism-trump-putinsocialism-reactionary [https://perma.cc/X7ZX-KX7N] (offering a helpful primer on the
subject of liberalism’s fate).
4
Benjamin Wallace-Wells, David French, Sohrab Ahmari, and the Battle for the
Future of Conservatism, NEW YORKER (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.newyorker
.com/news/the-political-scene/david-french-sohrab-ahmari-and-the-battle-for-the-futureof-conservatism [https://perma.cc/6XLM-K9BT].
5
See generally DENEEN, supra note 2. Originally published in 2018 and reprinted
in paperback with a new preface in 2019, the book has garnered significant
attention—even making President Obama’s recommended books list of 2018—and has
been reviewed in at least sixty publications, ranging from Foreign Affairs to First
Things, the National Review to the New York Times. See Mariana Alfaro, Obama Says
These Were His 29 Favorite Books of 2018, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 28, 2018, 3:34 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/barack-obama-books-2018-12 [https://perma.cc/AR2Y7FE6]; Christian Alejandro Gonzalez, We Still Need Liberalism, NAT’L REV. (June 22,
2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/06/book-review-why-liberalismfailed-patrick-deneen/ [https://perma.cc/NUG9-4Q84]; G. John Ikenberry, Why Liberalism Failed, FOREIGN AFFS., May–June 2018, at 191 (book review), https://www
.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2018-04-16/why-liberalism-failed [https://
perma.cc/2G33-UY9X]; Peter J. Leithart, Deneen Among the Liberals, FIRST THINGS
(Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2018/11/deneen-amongthe-liberals [https://perma.cc/GR4U-U6A2]; Jennifer Szalai, If Liberalism Is Dead,
What Comes Next?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/
17/books/review-why-liberalism-failed-patrick-deneen.html [https://perma.cc/6WYN9FY4].
6
DENEEN, supra note 2, at 3.
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Deneen insists these “deformations” are reflected both in the right’s
liberalism of individualism, as well as in the left’s liberalism of
diversity.7
Chief among liberalism’s “pathologies” is the “false turn it
made in its imposition of an ideological remaking of the world in
the image of a false anthropology.”8 At an individual level, this
“false anthropology” conceives of “increasingly separate, autonomous, nonrelational selves replete with rights and defined by our
liberty, but insecure, powerless, afraid, and alone.”9
At an institutional level, the “false anthropology” of the individual has coincided with and produced a form of legalism that has
supplanted custom and abandoned virtue and the common good in
favor of private interest.10 As the unity of church and state, religion and politics, and law and meaning, has been “disassembl[ed]”11
by a liberalism that privatizes meaning and reinterprets liberty as
the absence of any constraints rather than the realization of one’s
purposes, law, in turn, has come to be understood as that which
facilitates one’s unrestricted movement rather than as a tool for
realizing one’s purpose in the context of the relationships and
communities that provide meaning to one’s life.12
According to this critique, liberalism’s law replaces natural
and traditional social connections with artificial and procedural
relationships, producing, perversely, “a lawlessness” that “claims
to value ‘rule of law’ as it hollow[s] out every social norm and
custom in favor of legal codes.”13 Rather than conceiving law as an

7
Id. at 3, 17–18. “Conservatives and progressives alike have advanced liberalism’s project, and neither as constituted today can provide the new way forward that
must be discerned outside our rutted path.” Id. at 19.
8
Id. at 3, 19.
9
Id. at 16, 19.
10
Id. at 83.
11
Id. at 27.
12
Id. at 38.
[T]he more completely the sphere of autonomy is secured, the more comprehensive the state must become. Liberty, so defined, requires liberation from
all forms of associations and relationships, from family to church, from
schools to village and community, that exerted control over behavior through
informal and habituated expectations and norms. These controls were largely cultural, not political—law was less extensive and existed largely as a
continuation of cultural norms, the informal expectations of behavior learned
through family, church, and community. With the liberation of individuals
from these associations, there is more need to regulate behavior through the
imposition of positive law.
Id.
13
Id. at 82.
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extension of custom and as a tool for cultivating virtue and commending the common good, liberalism decouples law from meaning or purpose, and from character or virtue.14 The more that
human relationships are regulated by this “bad man” theory of
law, the weaker natural, organic ties between individuals and
each other and their communities.15 As a result, the law of liberalism—what Deneen calls “legalism”16—is left with nothing to do or
say with respect to personal virtue or the common good. “Delinked
from any conception of ‘completion’—telos or flourishing—and
disassociated from norms of natural law, legalism results in a
widespread effort to pursue desires as fully as possible while
minimally observing any legal prohibition.”17
According to Deneen, then, the problems facing liberal societies, the United States in particular, are twofold: (1) liberalism has
created a conception of the person whereby meaning-making in
traditional, natural (private) loci is undermined, while (2) also
leaving little, if any, space for considerations of the common good
or meaning-making in the public sphere.18 As a result, liberal
citizens are alienated, and liberal societies are listless.19
Americans are, according to these critiques, literally—but not
meaningfully—free.20 We have the right, but not the capacity, to
14
Id. at xiii–xiv. According to Deenen, before liberalism, liberty and self-rule were
“achieved not primarily by promulgated law—though law had its place—but through
extensive social norms in the form of custom. This was so much the case that Thomas
Aquinas regarded custom as a form of law, and often superior to formalized law,
having the benefit of long-standing consent.” Id. at xiii.
15
Id. at 38. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE PATH OF THE LAW (1897), in
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 171 (1920) (“If you want to know the law and nothing
else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
which such knowledge enables him to predict.”).
16
Id. at 82–83.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 38.
19
Much of this critique so far will sound somewhat familiar to those who have
followed communitarian and so-called “new traditionalist” critiques of liberal democracy. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT:
AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (Bloomsbury Acad., 3d ed. 2013) (1981).
20
DENEEN, supra note 2, at 38. Deneen is channeling the sort of distinction Isaiah
Berlin made between “positive” and “negative” liberty as well as Benjamin Constant’s
distinction between “liberty of the ancients” and “liberty of the moderns.” See, e.g.,
ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958), reprinted in THE PROPER STUDY
OF MANKIND 191, 202–04 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., Farrar, Straus &
Giroux 2000) (1997); BENJAMIN CONSTANT, THE LIBERTY OF ANCIENTS COMPARED
WITH THAT OF MODERNS (1816), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/constant-the-libertyof-ancients-compared-with-that-of-moderns-1819 [https://perma.cc/R8F8-94XW].
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self-govern.21 Meaning is increasingly elusive in the natural relationships of family, faith, and community; but the public realm
provides little—if any—basis for promoting virtue or inspiring a
commitment to the common good. We consume, but are never sated.
We are surrounded by others, yet alone.
Liberalism, in other words, has been one big bait-and-switch.
Using Deneen—as both a conversation partner and point of
entry to the post-fusionist critique of liberalism—this Article
demonstrates that the practices of liberalism, in law especially, are
much less vulnerable to the post-fusionist critique than the
theories of liberalism that Deneen and others target. Reminding
ourselves of the meaning-making capacities and the functions of
law better enables those invested in the future of the liberal
order—whether students, law teachers, legal professionals, or
simply citizens—to defend the institutions that order our world.
From American constitutional structure to contemporary corporate law, I argue that law supports meaning-making, virtue,
and the common good in two primary ways. First, by securing the
conditions for the exercise of individual conscience and associational autonomy in what we often consider the private sphere, the
law of liberalism enables individuals and communities to develop,
pursue, and share their most deeply held values, and to cultivate
the associated virtues in a context of mutual support and shared
meaning-making. Second, by supporting norms and adopting policies that guarantee equal citizenship in the public realm, the law
of liberalism recognizes the values of solidarity and equality in
pointing toward a vision of the common good realized in the public
realm. I conclude by calling legal educators and lawyers to recognize our responsibility in acknowledging and recovering law’s role
in making meaning, cultivating virtue, and supporting the
common good.
II. POST-FUSIONISM: SITUATING THE CRITIQUE
Until recently, conservatives in America were reliable liberals.22 They accepted a fundamental commitment to the rule of law,
acknowledged a separation between public and private spheres
and a consequent limitation on the power and role of government,

21
See generally Alexander Tsesis, Self-Government and the Declaration of
Independence, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 693 (2012).
22
Laura K. Field, Meet the Reocons, NISKANEN CTR. (Feb. 20, 2020),
https://www.niskanencenter.org/meet-the-reocons/ [https://perma.cc/3KK7-SWTF].
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and generally viewed individual rights and individual autonomy
as chief objects of concern.23 Even most traditionalist and religious
conservatives, for whom certain liberal values never quite fit,
made a bargain of sorts whereby they consented to classically
liberal arrangements, as long as the laws of the land provided
maximum freedom in the private sphere and perhaps a modicum
of influence in public life.24
But this conservative consensus surrounding liberal values is
now fraying. Post-fusionists have not only criticized liberalism of
the left, which is to be expected, but have also taken direct aim at
the very core of liberalism as historically theorized and practiced
by the political right in the United States.25 Consider the following
examples from 2019.
In March 2019, the prominent Catholic magazine First Things
published “Against the Dead Consensus,” a missive signed by fifteen prominent conservative thinkers that rejected pre-Trumpian
“[c]onsensus conservatism” on the grounds that it was nothing
more than a rights-based, free-market form of liberalism characterized by the “fetishizing of [individual] autonomy.”26 In addition
to expected references to the “transcendent dignity of the human
person” and the “soulless society of individual affluence,” the
authors proclaimed, among other things, that they “stand with the
American citizen,” “want a country that works for workers,” and
“believe home matters.”27 Such calls are recognizably conservative,
in a way, but a far cry from the classically liberal conservatism
that has been so influential in American politics at least since the
1960s.
In May 2019, Sohrab Ahmari, the op-ed editor of the New York
Post and one of the signatories of “Against the Dead Consensus”
penned a follow-up piece, also in First Things, in which he clarified
and personified the target of “Against the Dead Consensus.” In
23

Kay C. James, Defining the Principles of Conservatism, HERITAGE FOUND.
(Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/conservatism/commentary/defining-theprinciples-conservatism [https://perma.cc/CDE3-D7GJ].
24
This past “consensus” or “fusion” is exactly the sort of compromise that
animates the current ire of post-fusionists. Compromised fusionists include the
mainstream of the Republican Party and have been the rule, rather than the
exception, in the conservative movement, according to post-fusionists.
25
See, e.g., Field, supra note 22; Nick Burns, The New Intellectuals of the
American Right, NEW STATESMAN (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.newstatesman.com/
world/north-america/2020/04/new-intellectuals-american-right [https://perma.cc/9URN8QZZ].
26
Ahmari et al., supra note 2.
27
Id.
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“Against David French-ism,” Ahmari points to the “nice”ness of
French, a constitutional lawyer, as emblematic of a “persuasion or
a sensibility” among certain conservatives who mistakenly believe
that liberalism’s rule of law remains the best way to advance
conservative causes.28 Ahmari rejects what he considers French’s
naïve respect for the rule of law.29 He cites drag queen story hours
for children at public libraries as definitive proof that the old tools
of combat have failed conservatives in their fight against an
increasingly assertive and pernicious liberalism.30
In July 2019, the newly established Edmund Burke
Foundation organized a “National Conservatism” conference in
recognition, and celebration, of declining support for the “rulesbased liberal order” that once held sway among the American
conservative movement.31 The conference, according to its conveners, was designed to “recover and reconsolidate the rich tradition
of national conservative thought.”32 According to the conservative
National Review, the conference outlined a sort of “intellectual
Trumpism” for a conservative movement that is less solicitous of
the values shared by consensus conservativism regarding the rule
of law, limited government, and individual rights.33
In the face of these and other denouncements of liberalism and
its law, the legal academy has been somewhat slow to articulate a

28
Sohrab Ahmari, Against David French-ism, FIRST THINGS (May 29, 2019),
https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/05/against-david-french-ism [https://
perma.cc/UR7R-UFML].
29
Id.
30
Id.; for French’s initial written response to Ahmari, see David French, What
Sohrab Ahmari Gets Wrong, NAT’L REV. (May 30, 2019, 6:22 PM), https://www
.nationalreview.com/2019/05/david-french-response-sohrab-ahmari/ [https://perma.cc/
2RMR-2VZ2]. Throughout the summer and fall of 2019, conservative publications and
venues discussed the merits of Ahmari’s broadside against French. The two even faced
off in multiple head-to-head debates at Catholic universities around the nation.
Following the debate at Notre Dame, a student publication wrote, “French criticized
‘academic political theorists’ who can get ‘divorced from the real world.’ . . . He prizes
the practical approach: [French states,] ‘I’m not liberalism conceived, I’m liberalism
applied. That’s what a lawyer does.’ ” Bea Cuasay, The Ahmari-French Debate at Notre
Dame, IRISH ROVER (Sept. 26, 2019), https://irishrover.net/2019/09/the-ahmarifrench-debate-at-notre-dame/ [https://perma.cc/DJ45-6754].
31
A Conference in Washington, D.C., July 14–16, 2019: About, NAT’L CONSERVATISM, https://nationalconservatism.org/natcon-dc-2019/about [https://perma.cc/4WTE79YH] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
32
Id.
33
Jimmy Quinn, At the National Conservatism Conference, an “Intellectual
Trumpist” Movement Begins To Take Shape, NAT’L REV. (July 18, 2019, 6:30 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/07/national-conservatism-conference-intellectualtrumpist-movement/ [https://perma.cc/L78J-KWA3].
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defense of law’s capacity to respond to threats to the liberal order.
Even the one law journal that published a symposium issue
entitled The Travails of Liberal Democracy in late 2019 took only
partial advantage of the opportunity to feature voices defending
law’s role in responding to foundational critiques of liberal
democracy.34 Most of the symposium’s articles were authored by
philosophers, rather than lawyers, and only one addressed the
theoretical frontal assault on liberalism that is the focus of this
Article.35
The reasons for this oversight in the academy are explicable,
even if ultimately misguided. As a practical matter, most of the
recent post-fusionist discourse regarding liberalism’s decline has
taken place in venues infrequently visited by legal academics, such
as the pages of quasi-intellectual conservative and religious
publications and the debating stages of Catholic universities.
Furthermore, lawyers are often instinctively reluctant to consider
law’s role in making meaning or pursuing virtue. Such considerations, it might be assumed, smack of Sunday School or a
philosophy seminar and seem ill-suited to the grounded and
procedural work of law. Those interested in the survival of liberalism, either on the political right or left, must be prepared to
engage the concepts of purpose, virtue, and the common good that
animate critiques of liberalism as well as the contexts in which
those critiques are leveled.
As the author of the most complete post-fusionist critique of
liberalism so far, Patrick Deneen provides a natural conversation
partner for this Article. Deneen is neither a lawyer nor a legal
academic; despite this, he garners attention from the legal academy—although not as much as he probably deserves given his
influence among popular audiences and adjacent disciplines.36
Harvard Law Professor Adrian Vermeule, a member of the postfusionist camp and the leading legal theorist of so-called “Catholic
integralism,”37 has called Why Liberalism Failed a “masterpiece”

34

See 2019 Editors’ Symposium: The Travails of Liberal Democracy, 56 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 853 (2019).
35
See Micah Schwartzman & Jocelyn Wilson, The Unreasonableness of Catholic
Integralism, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2019).
36
About, PATRICK J. DENEEN, https://www.patrickjdeneen.com/about [https://
perma.cc/Q8QS-S2Y2] (last visited Dec. 28, 2020).
37
Catholic integralism refers to the Catholic political doctrine whereby the
separation of church and state is abolished and Catholic principles are “integrated”
into the laws governing society in a comprehensive way. It envisions the ultimate
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and a “triumph,”38 a commendation which reflects the potentially
radical implications of Deneen’s thought. Vermeule’s only critique
of Deneen is that his proposed ending, which involves a sort of
“Benedict Option”39 whereby communities of virtue remove themselves from the dominant and dying liberal society, seems
incongruous with Deneen’s diagnosis of the problem. Vermuele
proposes an alternative ending, “a kind of . . . fan fiction” in which
“rather than retreating to a nostalgic localism, nonliberal actors
strategically locate themselves within liberal institutions and
work to undo the liberalism of the state from within.”40
Yale Law Professor Samuel Moyn has also offered a somewhat
mixed review of Deneen, but for different reasons, praising
Deneen’s compelling critique of liberalism insofar as it applies to
libertarian liberalism or neoliberalism.41 Moyn pushes back, however, on Deneen’s generalizations regarding liberalism’s inevitable
decline and insists “that remedies are possible within modern
liberalism to bring out its virtues and contain its vices.”42 Moyn
further identifies the “real task” as “an ideological rescue mission
and an institutional reform,” and insists that
[t]he challenge is locating the right institutions, whether inherited from the past or invented afresh. But it is much better to
face this challenge than to follow Deneen and Dreher in ruefully
counseling people to drop out, or reactionaries like Vermeule in
insisting on a full-blown replacement of liberal institutions with
an “integralist” order.43

Moyn is right to insist that “fac[ing] this challenge” and
addressing the crisis of faith in liberalism requires “locating the

replacement of the institutions of liberal democracy with those of the Catholic Church.
See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 2.
38
Adrian Vermeule, Integration from Within, AM. AFFS. (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2018/02/integration-from-within/ [https://perma.cc/
BFB8-75SB] (reviewing PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED (2018)).
39
ROD DREHER, THE BENEDICT OPTION: A STRATEGY FOR CHRISTIANS IN A POSTCHRISTIAN NATION 2 (2017).
40
Vermeule, supra note 38. Vermeule has recently elaborated on his dissatisfaction with fellow conservatives and advocated for a “common-good constitutionalism”
rooted in his theory of integralism. Adrian Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/common-goodconstitutionalism/609037/ [https://perma.cc/U4VY-DNYN].
41
Samuel Moyn, Neoliberalism, Not Liberalism, Has Failed: A Response to Patrick Deneen, COMMONWEAL (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/
neoliberalism-not-liberalism-has-failed [https://perma.cc/3CGS-6HMW].
42
Id.
43
Id.
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right institutions,”44 but neither Moyn nor anyone else has fully
considered the ways that law, as an institution and as a practice,
tells a different story about liberalism than the decline narrative,
which is so focused on the supposed emptiness of liberalism in all
its forms. The reading of liberalism that Deneen and fellow postfusionists advance is ultimately both too theoretical and too
inevitable. Liberalism in a form serviceable to those on the political left and the political right remains alive in part because its
logic is not inexorable. Theory is transmitted, in fits and starts,
but always imperfectly, through the legal and political institutions
of the community. Deneen’s understanding of that institutional
mediation is incomplete and, as a result, he and fellow critics are
more pessimistic about the viability of liberalism than is warranted.
Liberalism is not in perfect health, but to assess its future, or
to defend its existence, the legal academy must look beyond theory
on the one hand and putative cultural decline on the other to
examine the concrete institutions and practices that order liberal
societies. Using Deneen as my interlocutor, this Article demonstrates that narratives of liberalism’s decline have overlooked and
misunderstood the role and relevance of law and will draw upon
legal norms, practices, and institutions—including legal education
and the legal profession itself—in elaborating upon Moyn’s observation “that remedies are possible within modern liberalism to
bring out its virtues and contain its vices.”45
III. UNITY, DIVERSITY, AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING
Founding Constraints46

A.

American law’s capacity to support meaning-making,
cultivate virtue, and promote the common good is rooted in the
history and structure of the Constitution.47 In his narrative of
inevitable decline, however, Deneen too quickly projects various
undesirable features of modern life onto the American founding
and onto James Madison, in particular.48 Deneen notes at the outset of Why Liberalism Failed that “we should rightly wonder
whether America is not in the early days of its eternal life but
44
45
46
47
48

Id.
Id.
DENEEN, supra note 2, at 161.
Id. at 162–65.
Id. at 101.
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rather approaching the end of the natural cycle of corruption and
decay that limits the lifespan of all human creations.”49 He later
spends almost an entire chapter tracing the role of the American
founding in liberalism’s failure.50
Deneen claims that James Madison’s liberal conception of the
person at once compromised the viability of communities and
associations where meaning-making typically occurs, and simultaneously empowered the national government to take on new, and
unjustified, power to itself.51 Furthermore, according to Deneen,
Madison’s celebration of “diversity” undermined the ability of
citizens to find any common vision of the public good or a shared
understanding of the virtues necessary for self-government.52 As
a result, the American founding serves as both a cautionary tale
and representative example of liberalism’s failures.53
Deneen further argues that the American experiment has
been doomed because the “Constitution is the embodiment of a set
of modern principles that sought to overturn ancient teachings and
shape a distinctly different modern human.”54 He directs his ire,
in particular, at the false promise of “pluralism” and the dangers
of fragmentation.55
According to James Madison in Federalist 10, the first object of
government is the protection of “the diversity in the faculties of
men” . . . . Government exists to protect the greatest possible
sphere of individual liberty, and it does so by encouraging the
pursuit of self-interest among both the citizenry and public servants. “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition”: powers
must be separate and divided powers to prevent any one person
from centralizing and seizing power . . . .56

Prioritizing “diversity in the faculties of men” and creating an
“enlarged orbit” of interests were meant to “inculcate civic indifference and privatism among the citizenry,” according to Deneen.57
Madison hoped one consequence of enlarging the orbit would be
heightened levels of mutual distrust among a citizenry inclined

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 4.
Id. at 161–78.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 163–64.
See id. at 165–66.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102–03.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 163–64.
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to advance particular interests, rendering them less likely to
combine and communicate . . . .
It was Madison’s hope that once the populace recognized its
relative powerlessness in the public realm, the people would
instead focus their attention on achievable private aims and
ends.58

The result, according to Deneen, is a republic that is
constitutively incapable of maintaining itself.59 “The system’s
architects intended to encourage a focus on private concerns
among the citizenry—a res idiotica that they called a ‘republic,’ ”
but “a republic cannot survive in the absence of ‘public things.’
The belief that liberalism could achieve modus vivendi by encouraging privatism has culminated in the nearly complete disassociation of the governing class and a citizenry without a cives.”60 In
other words, Deneen argues, the dual process of privatizing
purpose while conceiving meaning as nothing more than selfinterest has eroded any viable conception of citizenship or the
public good.61
Deneen also criticizes the Founders for adopting a republic—
or, as Deneen says, a res idiotica—rather than a democracy, on the
grounds that the Founders, like liberalism more generally, only
feigned interest in the will of the people and erected systems
insulated from the will and whims of the people.62
[B]oth classical and progressive liberals are dominated by
thinkers who praise the rule of the electorate even as they seek
to promote systemic governmental features that will minimize
electoral influence in the name of good policy outcomes. . . . The
authors and defenders of the Constitution argued on behalf of the
basic law by explicitly rejecting the notion that the Constitution
would result in a democracy.63

It is not only a bit anachronistic for Deneen to suggest the
Founders were insufficiently concerned with democracy—given
that the new Constitution, its limitations notwithstanding, was
the most democratic of its age—but especially ironic that Deneen

58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 164–65.
Id. at 165–66.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 162.
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levels this charge only one page after he criticizes the “presentism”
of liberals.64
In this and other ways, Deneen fundamentally misunderstands the context and purpose of The Federalist Papers, the
backgrounds of its authors, and the distinctly American iteration
of liberal, and republican, political theory the documents reflect.
The Federalist Papers are sometimes said to represent American
political theory at its best,65 not because they are the most
theoretically rigorous or even consistent texts, but rather because
they embody American philosophical and political pragmatism,
which has tended to adopt a more inductive approach to political
argumentation than the deductive, first-principles method
common in liberal political theory.66
The Founders acted in a particular context with particular
objectives in mind. The Articles of Confederation, under which the
states had operated from 1781 to 1787, had failed to provide a
mechanism for coordinating the distinct interests of the original
states, and as the nation grew and prepared to expand, the
challenge of instituting a structure for a successful, large republic
took on increasing salience.67 The Federalist Papers, therefore,
must be understood as persuasive political tracts and analyzed for
their rhetorical, persuasive appeal as much as, if not more than,
any theoretical principles they reflect. The Founders, including
the authors of The Federalist Papers, were lawyers, statesmen,
and rhetoricians and only incidentally, if at all, political theorists
in the traditional sense of the term.68
Deneen’s misunderstanding of the Founders’ context and purpose leads him to misinterpret key elements of the founding,
including the relationship between structure, theory, and virtue,
and the role of each in the future of the republic.

64

Id. at 161–62.
As Thomas Jefferson noted, “[d]escending from theory to practice, there can be
no better book than the Federalist.” GOTTFRIED DIETZE, THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC
ON FEDERALISM AND FREE GOVERNMENT 25 (paperback reprt. 1999). And as James
Madison observed, “[t]heoretical reasoning . . . must be qualified by the lessons of
practice,” and also “that the Philadelphia Convention ‘must have been compelled to
sacrifice theoretical propriety to the force of extraneous considerations.’ ” Id. (second
alteration in original).
66
See, e.g., Robert G. McCloskey, American Political Thought and the Study of
Politics, 51 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 115, 115–16 (1957).
67
DIETZE, supra note 65, at 25.
68
Cf. id. at 30 n.48 (explaining how the Founders were statesmen in addition to
theorists).
65
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Deneen seems to interpret the founding through the lens of
contemporary American culture and assumes a direct causal link
between theoretical commitments of the Founders and various
negative outcomes experienced in twenty-first-century American
life.69 This interpretive move is unwarranted. To blame Madison’s
theory of the state for social fragmentation, the decline of virtue,
and a loss of public-spiritedness assumes a logical inevitability between theoretical principles and social outcomes that simply does
not follow. In so doing, Deneen falls prey to the same critique he
levels against liberalism regarding its universalizing logic of
inevitability.70
B. E Pluribus Unum
While the Founders certainly took precautions to protect “diversity in the faculties of men,”71 they also valued unity, a
combination perhaps most clearly reflected in that original
national motto of the nation: E pluribus unum, “out of many,
one.”72 The sentiment behind this motto, of course, manifested in
the constitutional structure where a federal system divided power
between national and state governments and also facilitated
national unity among states with diverse interests and histories.
Consider also the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, which,
along with the rest of the Bill of Rights were adopted as part of a
compromise between the Federalists who supported the 1787
Constitution and the Anti-Federalists who feared it gave too much
power to the new national government.73 The Free Exercise Clause
recognizes, and protects, the many against a national government
that might focus on the unum to the detriment of the pluribus.74
The Establishment Clause, however, reflects the Nation’s early

69

DENEEN, supra note 2, at 1–3.
Id. at 3 (“Liberalism has failed—not because it fell short, but because it was
true to itself. It has failed because it has succeeded. As liberalism has ‘become more
fully itself,’ as its inner logic has become more evident and its self-contradictions
manifest, it has generated pathologies that are at once deformations of its claims yet
realizations of liberal ideology.”).
71
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 73 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
72
22 J. CONT’L CONG., 1774–1789, at 338, 339 (1782) (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1914);
71 CONG. REC. 918 (1929).
73
Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity,
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 322–23.
74
William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as
Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 561 (1983).
70
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commitment to unity amidst the diversity. By forbidding the establishment of religion, the Founders signaled their concern that
the public, the unum, not be captured by particular religious
viewpoints.
By protecting diversity and ensuring religious liberty, while
also working toward a common basis for public life, the Founders
appealed, implicitly and likely subconsciously, to multiple bases
for legitimacy: a neutralist, non-coercion-based legitimacy as well
as an expressivist conception of legitimacy. The neutralist theory
of legitimacy was given its fullest expression by twentieth-century
political theorist John Rawls but is rooted in the philosophy of
Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant.75 For a legal-political
system to be legitimate and “stab[le] for the right reasons,”76 laws
must be based on reasons that all reasonable citizens can accept,
which, in turn, imposes restrictions on the sorts of reasons that
are legitimately included in public deliberation, especially on
“constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.”77 The Establishment Clause points, albeit inchoately, to this theory of
legitimacy by gesturing toward a public realm that is not captured
by, or beholden to, particular religious influences.78
Expressivist theories of legitimacy, on the other hand, prioritize citizen engagement and expression as much as, if not more
than, the content of the deliberation or the reasons invoked. This
theory of legitimacy is traceable to Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theory
of legal and political community79 and has been influential in
various critiques of Rawlsian public reason.80 Where Kant emphasized the role of reason in securing a stable and predictable
conception of law, Hegel drew attention to law’s dynamic features

75

IMMANUEL KANT, On the Relationship of Theory to Practice in Political Right,
in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 73, 79 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1991) (“For if the law is such that a whole people could not possibly
agree to it . . . , it is unjust; but if it is at least possible that a people could agree to it,
it is our duty to consider the law as just . . . .”).
76
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 459 (expanded ed. 2005).
77
Id. at 442.
78
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
79
See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, §§ 183, 260, 267, 274 (T.M.
Knox trans., 1942) (1821). Hegel is often regarded as one of the most difficult of all
German philosophers to read. For an excellent and eminently readable overview of
Hegel’s expressivist critique of Kantian social contractarianism, see JEFFREY STOUT,
DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 77–85 (2004).
80
See Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, Rawls, Hegel, and Communitarianism, 19 POL.
THEORY 539, 541 (1991).
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and capacity.81 The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, again
only inchoately, anticipates an expressivist theory of legitimacy by
gesturing toward a dynamic, pluralist conception of the public
realm where diverse viewpoints are welcomed.
There is, of course, no authoritative “liberal” view regarding
the relationship between the state and private associations within
a liberal society, but the nation’s original motto reflects the
Founders’ recognition that citizens have dual, and potentially
conflicting, obligations, what Stanford Law professor Michael
McConnell has called “citizenship ambiguity.”82
For one category of liberals—let us call them the separationists—religion and state could be, and generally should be, kept
separate.83 Religion, according to the separationists, concerns individual belief more than action, and primarily implicates the
private realm. Therefore, religion should present few problems for
the administration of public matters. This view is most frequently
associated with John Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration, in
which he outlined a theory of religion focused on its internal
features, voluntariness, and the absence of conflict between
religious belief and political obligation.84
By this we see what difference there is between the Church and
the Commonwealth. Whatsoever is lawful in the Commonwealth,
cannot be prohibited by the Magistrate in the Church. Whatsoever is permitted unto any of his Subjects for their ordinary
use, neither can nor ought to be forbidden by him to any Sect of
People for their religious Uses.85

To put church-state controversies in the context of the nation’s
motto, the separationists assume the pluribus, churches, religious
dissenters, and “diversity in the faculties of men,”86 can be given
maximum liberty without undermining the integrity or identity of
the unum, the state, the common good, and the public sphere.87
While strict separationism need not inevitably result in the decline
81

See sources cited supra note 79.
Michael W. McConnell, Believers as Equal Citizens, in OBLIGATIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST
DEMOCRACIES 90, 92 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000). McConnell’s “Believers as
Equal Citizens” has deeply shaped the argument of this entire section.
83
Id. at 93.
84
See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (William Popple trans.,
London, Awnsham Churchill 1689).
85
Id. at 33.
86
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 71.
87
Neal Devins & Benjamin Feder, Reading the Establishment Clause,
COMMONWEAL, Sept. 20, 1985, at 492, 492.
82
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or marginalization of religion, this is part of Deneen’s critique of
liberalism in general, and of the American founding in particular.88 Conceiving religion as private, domesticated, and easily
bracketed reflects and perpetuates a fragmented conception of the
person whereby things of ultimate meaning are relegated to the
private realm and consequently diminished, which in turn hollows
out the institutions and associations themselves—thereby rendering them less worthy of protection and less able to facilitate the
formation of meaning and the pursuit of constitutive ends.89
For another category of liberals, let us call them the civic
totalists, religion was not so easily dismissed.90 Drawing upon
classical conceptions of a unified society, Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
for example, understood the powerful role of religion, including its
power to shape public life.91 He favored state control of religion in
service to the state—the pluribus in service of the unum—and
proposed a civic religion that was designed and controlled by the
state and was to be deployed to solidify individuals’ commitments
to the civic order.92 Individuals, according to Rousseau, were born
free but often failed to recognize their freedom because of social
conventions, the “preference[s]” of their “particular wills,” and the
indoctrination of so-called “partial societies.”93 For Rousseau,
promoting identification with the “general will” and banning the
“partial societies” had the advantage of removing a layer of
intermediary institutions that frequently interfered with the
individuals’ realization of true freedom and genuine equality.94
What does all this have to do with Deneen? Deneen projects
both the separationism of Locke and the civic totalism of Rousseau
onto his interpretation of Madison and the United States Constitution and then groups all together under the generally derisive
tag of “liberalism.”95 This conflation, however, is unwarranted.
Madison recognized more clearly than separationists like Locke
88

DENEEN, supra note 2, at 34.
See id. at 9.
90
Michael P. Bobic, Accommodationism and Religion, FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA (2017), https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/825/accommodationismand-religion [https://perma.cc/L68Q-T5JK].
91
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in
ROUSSEAU: THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 39, 148
(Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., 1997).
92
Id. at 150–51.
93
Id. at 60–62 (“It is important, then, that in order to have the general will
expressed well, there be no partial society in the State . . . .”).
94
Id.
95
DENEEN, supra note 2, at 36–37.
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the inevitable tension between the pluribus of religion and the
unum of state.96 Madison followed Rousseau in appreciating the
important role of religion, including its implications for public life,
but he rejected Rousseau’s civic totalism whereby religion
primarily operated in service to the state.97 Madison’s aims, to be
sure, were not simply to “disassemble . . . irrational religious and
social norms.”98 Rather, he sought to implement a constitutional
structure that could account for this inevitable tension and, to the
extent possible, provide accommodations for religious diversity
and “diversity in the faculties of men,” without losing sight of the
project for national unity.99
Deneen also misunderstands, and underestimates, Madison’s
interest in virtue and the common good. The mere fact that
Madison was especially interested in the role of structure to
produce good outcomes, or at least prevent bad outcomes, did not
mean that Madison was uninterested in virtue. Informed by his
early Calvinist influences and education, Madison insisted that
structure, including law, and virtue complemented each other.100
As he argued in Federalist 57:
The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first
to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and
most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society, and in the
next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping
them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust. The
elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of
republican government. The means relied on in this form of government for preventing their degeneracy are numerous and
various.101

96

A recognition reflected most clearly in the text and history of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment.
97
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 71. Following the adoption of the Constitution and
Bill of Rights, Madison continued to defend the sort of “partial societies” that Rousseau rejected. Madison, for example, acted as a leading advocate of the DemocraticRepublican civic associations that formed during and after the Whiskey Rebellion of
1794. See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Democratic-Republican Societies, Subversion, and
the Limits of Legitimate Political Dissent in the Early Republic, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1525,
1532–33 (2004); John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV.
565, 577–81 (2010).
98
DENEEN, supra note 2, at 24.
99
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 71.
100
See, e.g., Leonard R. Sorenson, Madison on Sympathy, Virtue, and Ambition in
the Federalist Papers, 27 POLITY 431, 432–34 (1995).
101
THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 71, at 348 (James Madison).
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While neither the Founders nor the 1787 Constitution was
perfect, the approach taken by the Founders reflects and has
helped perpetuate a central truth regarding the maintenance of a
liberal republic: virtues of humility and conviction are important
on their own and in tandem, and even perhaps in tension, with
each other. From a system-level perspective, the state must be
designed in such a way as to promote with conviction shared
values, but those efforts must always be tempered by a recognition
of pluribus and the limits of the state’s power or competencies.
These virtues of humility and conviction are useful for individuals
as well. Citizens who feel a sense of conviction regarding the value
of their system, while also recognizing the limits of their own
knowledge and values, are most equipped to undertake the sort of
public deliberation that liberal democracy requires.
IV. LAW AND MEANING: LEGISLATIVE
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
The post-fusionist critique of liberalism is ultimately a story
about disenchantment and the loss of meaning. Human beings are
purposive and social creatures, according to Deneen, and liberalism, as theorized on the right and left, systematically separates
the self from the things that provide meaning, purpose, and
belonging.102 “[L]iberalism teaches a people to hedge commitments
and adopt flexible relationships and bonds. Not only are all political and economic relationships seen as fungible and subject to
constant redefinition, so are all relationships—to place, to neighborhood, to nation, to family, and to religion. Liberalism encourages loose connections.”103
In its quest for universally applicable principles of justice,
liberal theory has often resorted to thin, caricatured views of
personhood, separated from history and located in a state of nature
or behind a “veil of ignorance.”104 “Individuals, liberated and
displaced from particular histories and practices, are rendered
fungible within a political-economic system that requires universally replaceable parts.”105 Separated from history and unable to
forge a vision for the future or a common conception of the good,
liberal societies, Deneen insists, struggle to engage, much less

102
103
104
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DENEEN, supra note 2, at 34.
Id.
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118–23 (6th prtg. 2003).
DENEEN, supra note 2, at 82.
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facilitate, meaning-making.106 “In this world, gratitude to the past
and obligations to the future are replaced by a nearly universal
pursuit of immediate gratification . . . .”107
The story Deneen tells is a compelling one in certain respects,
but less so when the critique is focused on liberal practices rather
than liberal theory. In this Section, I catalogue various ways in
which American law recognizes human beings as embedded
creatures who seek meaning and recognition in community. I outline some ways that law enables individuals to realize their
constitutive ends and facilitates the formation of robust communal
memberships, even on some occasions when communal norms
challenge liberal values and in contexts ranging from constitutional
to corporate law. In addition to providing impersonal, procedural
norms for regulating behavior, law signals values, embodies
commitments, promotes particular visions of the good, and teaches
citizens what citizenship in a liberal democracy entails.
Law supports meaning-making in two primary ways. First, by
securing the conditions for the exercise of individual conscience
and associational autonomy, in what we often consider the private
sphere, the law of liberalism enables individuals and communities
to develop, pursue, and share their most deeply held values and to
cultivate the associated virtues in a context of mutual support and
shared meaning-making. Second, by supporting norms and adopting policies that guarantee equal citizenship in the public realm,
the law of liberalism recognizes the values of solidarity and
equality in pointing toward a vision of the common good realized
in the public realm. Recall our nation’s original motto, discussed
above. The pluribus charge of that motto aims to take seriously
the “diversity in the faculties of men,”108 while the unum points
towards that which we share in common as citizens.
It is not simply the structure of American constitutional law
that supports shared meaning-making, however. Recent legislative and constitutional developments reflect law’s capacity to
enable meaning-making, facilitate virtue, and promote the
common good.

106
107
108

Id. at 29–30, 34.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 163 (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 71).
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Conscience and Community

Deneen claims that the individualism of liberalism alienates
individuals from their communities and sources of meaning, which
leaves them only able to find meaning through the state:109
Shorn of the deepest ties to family (nuclear as well as extended),
place, community, region, religion, and culture, and deeply
shaped to believe that these forms of associations are limits upon
their autonomy, deracinated humans seek belonging and selfdefinition through the only legitimate form of organization remaining available to them: the state.110

While this total dependence on the state might characterize a
system organized on the basis of Rousseau’s civic totalism—one
that dissolves so-called “partial societies” for the sake of realizing
“true” freedom and equality via the state111—this is simply not the
way American law works.
It is of course too simple to draw a straight line from Madison
to contemporary America or from Rousseau to contemporary
France, but the two nations have consistently reflected distinctive
visions of liberal community. In his haste to lump various forms
of liberalism together and dismiss them, Deneen misses this
nuance.
Forty years after the Founding, Alexis de Tocqueville, one of
Deneen’s intellectual heroes, observed the powerful role civil
associations had played in cultivating Americans’ capacity for selfgovernance, in contrast to what he perceived as France’s dependence on the state:112
Americans [form] associations [for] entertainment[ ], to found . . .
education[nal institutions], to build inns, to construct churches,
to [distribute] books, [and] to . . . found hospitals, prisons, and
schools . . . . Wherever . . . [there is a] new undertaking . . . [in
the place of] the government in France, . . . in the United States
you will be sure to find an association.113

Questions regarding the role and extent of the state as the
mediator of citizens’ freedom continue to play out differently in
109

Id. at 60–61.
Id. at 60.
111
ROUSSEAU, supra note 91, at 27.
112
In his tour of America, Tocqueville observed Americans through participating
in civil associations and found that “[f]eelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is
enlarged, and the human mind is developed by no other means than by the reciprocal
influence of men upon each other.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 983 (Henry Reeve trans., Floating Press 2009) (1840).
113
Id. at 979.
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French and American contexts. Consider recent disputes regarding religious dress. France has generally conceived of the public
in more aspirational terms and has been less inclined to tolerate
departures from “French” norms, including, for example, wearing
of the hijab in public contexts.114 Hijab bans in public contexts
have typically been justified on the grounds that they reflect the
internalization of inferiority by women who wear them and the
public should avoid being complicit in such oppression.115 French
laïcité is much more demanding than whatever form of secularism
is facilitated by the Establishment Clause of the American Constitution, which is counterbalanced by the right to religious free
exercise.116
Or consider the different ways the two nations treat nonprofit
corporations. The United States differs from France and just
about every other nation in the way its tax laws view nonprofit
corporations.117 Individuals and groups in the United States can
easily form nonprofit corporations to advance an extraordinarily
wide range of issues. The 501(c)(3) charitable nonprofit corporation, which facilitates the advancement of religious, educational,
charitable, scientific, literary, and other causes, is the most wellknown, but section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for
thirty-three different types of nonprofit corporations, ranging from
civil leagues and chambers of commerce to cemetery companies
and credit unions.118 Formation of nonprofit corporations not only
provides a mechanism for their creators to promote their values,
along with fellow like-minded citizens, but also enables individual
taxpayers to make tax-exempt donations to these organizations in
order to advance their concerns and signal their values.119 While
it is almost certainly more efficient for the state to provide social
services directly, rather than allowing individuals to effectively
decide where some of their tax dollars will be used, American
norms and American tax law reflect a distinctly American
commitment to the role and value of private associations.120 As
Tocqueville noted, participation in these sorts of civic associations
not only enables the development of various virtues necessary for
114

See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 82, at 100–02.
Id.
116
Id. at 101–04.
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See, e.g., Alyssa A. DiRusso, American Nonprofit Law in Comparative
Perspective, 10 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 39, 75 (2011).
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See I.R.C. § 501.
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See I.R.C. § 170(a)(1).
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democracy but also reflects the importance of communities in
developing capacities for meaning-making and self-governance.121
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment has historically reflected the Founders’ commitment to freedom of conscience
as well as their recognition of the role of private, non-state associations and communities in meaning-making.122 In the wake of
Employment Division v. Smith, however, that constitutional
protection has been weakened.123 Whereas under the previous
Free Exercise Clause standards, burdens on religious free exercise
had to be justified on the basis of a compelling state interest, such
burdens are now presumptively valid if resulting from a law that
is “generally applicable” and “religion-neutral.”124
While this new interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause has
substantively limited the religious liberty of certain populations,125
the overall impact to religious liberty and associational autonomy
has been less significant than some onlookers had predicted.126 In
response to the unpopular Smith decision in 1990, Congress
passed—by a simple voice vote in the House127 and by ninety-seven
to three in the Senate128—the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) that aimed to reinstate the previous compelling-stateinterest standard to Free Exercise case law.129 Although the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled in City of Boerne v.
Flores that Congress overstepped its authority in establishing
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Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and
the Impossibility of Its Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 616–17, 620–21 (2006).
123
Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-86 (1990).
124
Id. at 886 n.3. “Our conclusion that generally applicable, religion-neutral laws
that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified
by a compelling governmental interest is the only approach compatible with these
precedents.” Id.
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Burdens to religious liberty arising from state, not federal, action and that are
not easily recast in the language of freedom of speech or expressive association are
less protected following Smith.
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See, e.g., The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 1–2, 4, 7, 37–38, 47–48 (1992).
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H.R. REP. NO. 103-88 (1993).
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S. REP. NO. 103-111 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892.
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Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
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RFRA, as it applied to states,130 RFRA continues to apply to federally imposed burdens to religious liberty.131 In 1993, states also
began to adopt their own RFRAs, resulting in a current total of
twenty-one state-based RFRAs.132 Congress and states have stepped
in to fill gaps as the Free Exercise Clause has lost its bite at the
Supreme Court.
Even as the Free Exercise Clause came to be interpreted less
expansively by the Supreme Court, the Court has expanded its
jurisprudence in other related areas, such as expressive association.133 While not explicitly mentioned in the First Amendment,
courts have determined that a right of expressive association is
implied by, or derives from, other protected First Amendment
rights, including free speech, free exercise, petition, and assembly.134 In one of the foundational expressive association cases, the
Supreme Court explained, “[T]he constitutional shelter afforded
such relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw
much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.
Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define
one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty.”135 In a
series of cases since, the Supreme Court and other lower courts
have cited the right of expressive association in recognizing that
the search for meaning, purpose, and identity are collective endeavors facilitated by the First Amendment.136
These developments reveal not only the persistence of
meaning-making institutions and communities but also the
adaptability of American law to acknowledge and support the
formation and maintenance of communities where virtue is
developed and meaning is found.
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City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519, superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, as recognized in
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015).
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B. Solidarity and Equality
Recall that Deneen believes liberalism has failed not only
because of its inability to take seriously the traditional sources of
meaning and loci of virtue but also because of its impoverished
conception of the common good.137 Prior to the “Great Separation”
of faith and politics and of law and meaning, premodern societies
were characterized by a degree of unity that liberalism forecloses.138 Where premodern law worked hand-in-glove with the
customs of a community and was informed by natural law, modern
liberal law is disconnected from custom and is rooted in artificial,
positive law.139 Deneen bemoans a modern liberal world characterized by separation rather than unity and in which law regulates
bad behavior but is not part of a holistic, integrated effort to
cultivate individual virtue and promote the common good.140
While Deneen is correct to note the development of the “bad
man” theory of law that has coincided with, and been shaped by,
the rise of liberalism,141 he is too quick to assume that liberal law
lacks the ability to teach and form as well as to regulate or punish.
Just because liberal societies tend to be especially solicitous of the
meaning-making role of private associations and affiliations does
not mean that liberal states can, or should, ignore law’s capacity
for meaning-making and identity formation in the public sphere.
Citizenship in a liberal republic requires the liberal state to
recognize individuals as free and equal before the law. The liberal
state’s commitment to free and equal citizenship is a reflection of
the society’s commitment to solidarity and equality and is meant
to apply to all citizens irrespective of their particular backgrounds.
Cathleen Kaveny, professor of law at Boston College, and former
colleague of Deneen’s at Notre Dame, has offered “a nuanced view
about how law can function as a moral teacher in a pluralistic
society such as the United States, a view that is at once optimistic
about the effectiveness of moral pedagogy without being utopian,
and realistic about moral disagreement without being relativistic.”142 This combination of dispositions is particularly useful in
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Id. at 38.
139
Id.
140
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a liberal democracy where legitimacy requires some measure of
consent and effectiveness.
According to Kaveny, “If we look closely at the American legal
system, we will find ample evidence of how law can still function
as a powerful moral teacher by holding up a compelling, integrated
vision of our common life that inspires people to move beyond its
strict requirements.”143 In particular, she points to signature legislative efforts such as the Civil Rights Act,144 the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA),145 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA)146 as tangible reflections of the vision of American
political community and the role of law in realizing that vision of
solidarity.147 These legislative accomplishments “all adopt a normative and holistic attitude toward the function of law; in other
words, each law gestures toward a vision of how the citizens of the
United States should live their lives in common.”148 In particular,
“each piece of legislation signals the hope that the subjects of the
law will move beyond mere compliance with the external requirements of the law to appreciate the broader vision of community
that it wishes to encourage.”149 The content of “that broader vision
of community,” according to Kaveny, “exemplifies the fruitful relationship between autonomy and solidarity.”150
Kaveny’s work calls to mind Robert Cover’s now-famous
Nomos and Narrative, in which he argues that law performs both
a “world-creating” as well as a “world[-]maintaining” function.151
These functions map onto, respectively, law-as-meaning and lawas-social-control and to two distinctive approaches to education:
“paideic” and “imperial.”152 The paideic, or world-creating, idealtypical pattern aims to educate citizens into a normative system
and involves “a sense of direction or growth that is constituted as
the individual and his community work out the implications of
their law.”153 The discourse that emerges from the paiedeic model
is “initiatory, celebratory, expressive, and performative, rather
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Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
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than critical and analytic.”154 In contrast, the imperial, or worldmaintaining, ideal-typical pattern, involves educating citizens
about different values and systems, and in this model “norms are
universal and enforced by institutions.”155 The discourse of this
system is “premised on objectivity,” and “[i]nterpersonal commitments are weak, premised only upon a minimalist obligation to
refrain from . . . coercion and violence.”156
Whether dealing with race, gender, or disability, the legislative efforts that Kaveny describes reflect a conception of liberty
that does not fit squarely with the negative view of liberty that
Deneen associates with liberalism. The Family and Medical Leave
Act, which requires employers to provide unpaid family and
medical leave in qualifying circumstances,157 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discrimination on the basis
of disability and imposes accessibility requirements on public
accommodations,158 reflect a positive conception of liberty and a
substantive, rather than merely formal, conception of equality.
One who fears taking off work to care for a child or one whose
disabilities prevent her wheelchair from accessing a potential
place of employment is not unfree from the standpoint of negative
liberty. The problems that these pieces of legislation address deal
not with tangible, state-sanctioned limits on the free movement of
individuals but rather the capacity of individuals for selfrealization and full participation in the community.
Similarly, the public accommodations and public facilities
provisions of the Civil Rights Act were designed to remove the
badges of inferiority that had marked Black Americans since the
early days of the republic.159 Even if formal, state-based discrimination ended, the Civil Rights Act recognized that full, free, and
equal citizenship could not be realized if a group of citizens were
unable to take part in a wide range of social and economic
activities.160
Deneen seems to have an all-or-nothing understanding of law’s
relationship to social norms and meaning-making.161 Either law
is organically and inextricably bound up with a community’s
154
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156
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158
159
160
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customs and aspirations, which seems to be his preference, or law
is simply a matter of regulation and compliance.162 In the preface
to his updated 2019 edition of Why Liberalism Failed, Deneen cites
Thomas Aquinas for conceiving “custom as a form of law.”163
Throughout the book, when speaking of liberal law, Deneen
frames in terms of its role “disassembling” what has come
before.164
Where Deneen sees liberal law through the lens of compliance
and views pluralism as a threat to common purpose, Kaveny
shows that law reflects and shapes a community’s vision, and she
does “not believe the moral, religious, and cultural pluralism that
characterizes American society precludes the possibility for our
law to function as an effective moral teacher.”165 Deneen is hampered here in part by his lack of engagement with law in the
context of the Protestant Reformation and its aftermath. Early
Christian understandings of law frequently conceived civil law as
continuous with, and inseparable from, religious law, a view which
persists among certain Catholic post-fusionists, the integralists
most obviously.166 Martin Luther planted seeds for the separation
of civil and religious realms, including the “bad man” theory of law
that Deneen associates with liberalism.167 According to Luther,
law was only necessary because of human sin,168 but, for John
Calvin, law played an essential role not simply in punishing bad
behavior but in teaching values and in molding character.169 These
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Protestant conceptions of civil society have deeply shaped the
modern development of republicanism and liberalism, including
the founding of the United States.170 American law certainly regulates bad behavior, but it also facilitates solidarity by signaling
which values merit the state’s imprimatur.
C. Between (Private) Communities and (Public) Solidarity:
Hard Cases
Achieving solidarity in some of the ways Kaveny describes has
admittedly come at a cost. Employers have had to change cultures
and expend additional resources to avoid discrimination and to
accommodate employees with disabilities or those on leave to care
for family.171 Private businesses no longer have the freedom to
serve simply those whom they want to serve but are now forbidden
from discriminating on the basis of race, among other things.172
Mainstream American culture seems to have accepted, and
embraced, these tradeoffs, however, and has come to see law—
whether we are fully conscious of it or not—as necessary for the
fuller realization of our shared identity. Yet it would be naïve to
ignore the conceptual and practical tensions that arise when
different, important values come into conflict, including conflicts
between values associated with conscience and community and
those associated with solidarity and equal treatment.
Conflicts concerning fundamental values are typically taken
up by the courts, but public understanding surrounding these
types of cases is often hampered by various judicial norms. Judges
are neither philosophers nor theologians, and courts are neither
college seminars nor Sunday schools. Courts are bound by certain
rules and norms, including staying within the bounds of the record
of the case and issuing as narrow of a ruling as possible to resolve
disputes. While these norms are important, they can obscure the
extent to which constitutional law often concerns the deep conflict
of fundamental values, leaving non-lawyer onlookers a bit dissatisfied or confused.
a degree of wisdom, as that they may not, by the daily instruction of the Law,
advance to a purer knowledge of the Divine will.
JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 158 (Anthony Uyl ed., Henry
Beveridge trans., 2017).
170
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171
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Christian Legal Society v. Martinez

Consider, for example, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,173
in which the Supreme Court reviewed the applicability of
nondiscrimination policies for religious groups in the university
context.174 The Martinez litigation concerned whether the Christian Legal Society (CLS) at the University of California–Hastings
Law School could discriminate in its membership selection on the
basis of religion and sexual orientation and still maintain its
affiliation with the law school.175 Hastings considered its nondiscrimination policy a legitimate tool for preventing discrimination
against gay and lesbian students and for promoting tolerance.176
The Christian Legal Society claimed Hastings’s nondiscrimination
policy unconstitutionally restricted its associational freedom by
tying its eligibility for university recognition, including meeting
space and an allocation of student activity fees, to its willingness
to change its beliefs regarding human sexuality as well as its
practices regarding group membership.177 In a decision that left
somewhat unresolved the extent to which public universities can
limit associational freedoms in limited public forum contexts, the
Court upheld Hastings’s nondiscrimination policy, which required
CLS either not to discriminate on the basis of religion or sexual
orientation or forego university affiliation and the attendant
benefits.178
The obvious conflict in the case concerned the autonomy
interests of a conservative religious student group against the full
inclusion rights of gay students, but Justice Ginsburg’s majority
opinion was careful not to frame the controversy as one about full
and free citizenship or the vision of the political community.179
Rather, Ginsburg emphasized the neutral design and application
of the Hastings’s nondiscrimination policy,180 and she downplayed
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the aspirational qualities of the nondiscrimination policy.181 She
minimized the harm done to CLS by the application of the policy,182
and she only considered one version of the policy, which lent itself
more easily to neutralist interpretations.183 Furthermore, Ginsburg made clear it was not the Court’s role to assess the
“advisability” of the public forum that Hastings has established,
only the “permissibility.”184
Ginsburg neither celebrated the nondiscrimination aspirations of Hastings nor criticized what the concurring opinions
considered the narrowness of CLS but instead praised the
“textbook viewpoint neutral[ity]” of the Hastings policy.185 Since
neutrality was Ginsburg’s focus, and since she determined the
policy to have been designed and applied in a neutral way, Ginsburg avoided having to discuss directly the particular burdens
upon, or the rights of, the religious student group in the Martinez
controversy.186 While this approach is perhaps technically sufficient, it leaves skeptics and supporters alike dissatisfied in that it
elides questions regarding the value and role of associations and
religious communities, on the one hand, and the importance of
inclusion and nondiscrimination on the other.
One can almost hear Robert Cover shouting at the Court from
the grave! In the closing pages of Cover’s Nomos and Narrative,187
he bemoans what he considered the Supreme Court’s cowardly
ruling in Bob Jones University v. United States, in which the Court
upheld the IRS’s removal of tax-exempt status for the university,

181
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the policy is the fact that she does not really acknowledge any aspirational features of
the policy. See id. at 667–98.
182
Id. at 673 (“If CLS instead chose to operate outside the RSO program, Hastings
stated, the school ‘would be pleased to provide [CLS] the use of Hastings facilities for
its meetings and activities.’ CLS would also have access to chalkboards and generally
available campus bulletin boards to announce its events. In other words, Hastings
would do nothing to suppress CLS’s endeavors, but neither would it lend RSO-level
support for them.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
183
See id. at 675–78.
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185
Id. at 695.
186
Id. at 667–703.
187
Cover, supra note 151, at 60–68.

488

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:457

even though Bob Jones cited its religious beliefs as the basis for its
racially discriminatory policies.188 According to Cover:
The Court assumes a position that places nothing at risk and
from which the Court makes no interpretive gesture at all, save
the quintessential gesture to the jurisdictional canons: the statement that an exercise of political authority was not
unconstitutional. The grand national travail against discrimination is given no normative status in the Court’s opinion, save that
it means the IRS was not wrong. . . .
. . . It is a case in which authority is vindicated without the
expression of judicial commitment to principle that is embodied
in constitutional decision. In the impoverished commitment of
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion, the constitutional question was
not unnecessary, but the Court avoided it by simply throwing the
claim of protected insularity to the mercy of public policy. The
insular communities deserved better—they deserved a constitutional hedge against mere administration. And the minority
community deserved more—it deserved a constitutional commitment to avoiding public subsidization of racism.189

Cover goes on to acknowledge in a footnote that
[s]uch a commitment would necessarily have invited a host of
problems. But that is as it should be. The invasion of the nomos
of the insular community ought to be based on more than the
passing will of the state. It ought to be grounded on an interpretive commitment that is as fundamental as that of the insular
community.190

In other words, according to Cover, the liberal state must recognize
that law is more than a mechanism for coordination or punishment; it reflects and creates normative universes, and even insular
communities seeking to discriminate on the basis of race, religion,
or sexual orientation deserve to be told candidly what substantive
vision of solidarity through law is the basis for limiting their
associational autonomy.191
2.

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.

Consider, also, the much-celebrated and much-maligned
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., decision in which a Health and
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Human Services (HHS) regulation adopted under the Affordable
Care Act imposed a “contraception mandate” on employers who
have more than fifty employees.192 Hobby Lobby and other closely
held corporations contested the HHS regulation on the grounds
that it imposed a burden on the corporations’ sincerely held religious beliefs and thus violated RFRA.193 The petitioners objected,
in particular, to being forced to cover four forms of contraception
that they considered abortifacients and thus especially objectionable.194 Hobby Lobby insisted that, as a closely held corporation
that operates on the basis of religious values, it should be eligible
for the same work-around that the HHS regulation provided for religious nonprofit corporations to be exempted from the mandate.195
HHS argued, and the Third Circuit ruled, that Hobby Lobby
could not bring a successful religious liberty claim under RFRA
because it was a for-profit corporation.196 The Third Circuit
explained, “General business corporations do not, separate and
apart from the actions or belief systems of their individual owners
or employees, exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe
sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions separate
and apart from the intention and direction of their individual
actors.”197
The majority opinion, written by Justice Alito, reversed the
Third Circuit and upheld Hobby Lobby’s claim, citing both general
corporation law as well as the particular features of the corporations at issue in the case.198 In Alito’s opinion, to deny Hobby
Lobby’s claim under RFRA would be a form of unjust discrimination, effectively making it more expensive to be business owners
who seek to live out their values through their work than to be
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business owners who simply want to make a profit.199 The record
clearly revealed, according to Alito, business owners who sought
to align their work with their values:
Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose commits the [plaintiffs]
to “[h]onoring the Lord in all [they] do by operating the company
in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.” Each family
member has signed a pledge to run the businesses in accordance
with the family’s religious beliefs and to use the family assets to
support Christian ministries. In accordance with those commitments, Hobby Lobby and Mardel stores close on Sundays, even
though the [plaintiffs] calculate that they lose millions in sales
annually by doing so. The businesses refuse to engage in profitable transactions that facilitate or promote alcohol use; they
contribute profits to Christian missionaries and ministries; and
they buy hundreds of full-page newspaper ads inviting people to
“know Jesus as Lord and Savior.”200

Of particular relevance to the case, the plaintiffs “believe that life
begins at conception and that it would violate their religion to
facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate
after that point.”201
Alito further noted that since “HHS concedes that nonprofit
corporations can be protected by RFRA,” the “corporate form alone
cannot provide the explanation” for refusing Hobby Lobby’s RFRA
claim,202 especially since the division between for-profit and nonprofit corporations in the context of religious liberty claims is
simply not “clear-cut.”203 Alito explained:
Not all corporations that decline to organize as nonprofits do so
in order to maximize profit. For example, organizations with
religious and charitable aims might organize as for-profit corporations because of the potential advantages of that corporate
form, such as the freedom to participate in lobbying for legislation or campaigning for political candidates who promote their
religious or charitable goals.204

“This argument,”205 “that RFRA does not protect for-profit
corporations because the purpose of such corporations is simply to
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make money,”206 Alito concluded, “flies in the face of modern corporate law.”207 Pointing to the history and structure of corporation
law, Alito determined:
While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit
corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not
require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of
everything else, and many do not do so. For-profit corporations,
with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable
causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to
further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives.208

Alito went on to note recent developments in corporation law that
have made it even easier for owners to integrate their values into
their work:209
In fact, recognizing the inherent compatibility between establishing a for-profit corporation and pursuing nonprofit goals,
States have increasingly adopted laws formally recognizing
hybrid corporate forms. Over half of the States, for instance, now
recognize the “benefit corporation,” a dual-purpose entity that
seeks to achieve both a benefit for the public and a profit for its
owners.210

Thirty-six states, plus the District of Columbia, currently
provide for the creation of benefit corporations, enabling their
owners to advance and signal their values to external audiences
while also conducting the more traditional activities associated
with corporations.211
Whether one views the outcome of Hobby Lobby favorably or
unfavorably, it is hard to deny that the case concerned complicated
questions of meaning, purpose, and identity and involved individuals seeking to express their values and pursue their ends, not
simply their economic interests, in the context of their interpretive
communities.212
206
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What Hobby Lobby reveals, perhaps most clearly, is the pervasiveness of considerations of meaning and purpose in American
law. It is somewhat widely recognized that the Constitution
creates and maintains contexts in which individuals can give voice
to their deepest values;213 it is less widely recognized that even
American corporate law’s history and structure provide individuals who seek integrated lives some tools for realizing that
integration. And even though the form of that integration in
Hobby Lobby took on a politically conservative valence, there is
nothing, as a formal matter, that precludes closely held corporations from seeking integration for more liberal or progressive
causes. As Alito noted, “So long as its owners agree, a for-profit
corporation may take costly pollution-control and energy-conservation measures that go beyond what the law requires. A forprofit corporation that operates facilities in other countries may
exceed the requirements of local law regarding working conditions
and benefits.”214 Stated differently, corporate law in America
affirmatively enables those who own closely held corporations to
pursue their values through their work.215
The question courts must ask when important values conflict
is not whether to traffic in meaning, purpose, and identity, but in
what way to do so. Alito’s opinion made a strong, liberal, case for
respecting the religious liberty rights of the petitioners so that
they could integrate the personal and professional spheres of their
lives, but it should not be forgotten that, on the other side, HHS
articulated a compelling—even if not compelling enough for the
majority—case for the interests of women.216 Similar to the
motivation of legislative acts such as the ADA and FMLA, the
HHS regulation was designed to effectuate the freedom of a
frequently disadvantaged segment of the population: women.217
By requiring employers to cover preventive health care plans—
crisis has provided a new cause for skepticism regarding the company’s integrity. See,
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which typically cost more for women than for men—the ACA, in
general, and the HHS regulation, in particular, aimed to fulfill the
promise to women of full and equal citizenship.218
While the conflicts between conscience and community, and
between fairness and solidarity, can feel intractable, the conflicts
themselves offer a clear reminder that law in the United States
does not preclude the pursuit of meaning but rather it provides a
mechanism for mediating different visions of meaning-making and
the relationship between individuals, groups, and the state.
V. LIBERALISM’S PERSISTENCE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
A.

Finding Agency in Uncertain Times

I have suggested that the conclusions of Deneen and the postfusionists should be resisted for various reasons, among them
(1) liberal practices, including law, should be distinguished from
liberal theory; (2) liberal law reflects and facilitates meaningmaking, cultivation of virtue, and pursuit of the common good in
ways that these critics overlook; and (3) because of the foregoing
reasons, the story of the inevitable, or already complete, demise of
liberalism is misguided.
While Deneen overstates the inevitability of liberalism’s
demise and overlooks ways the law of liberalism can guard against
some of its deleterious effects, he is not completely wrong.
Deneen’s critique has received such a warm welcome precisely
because he has tapped into the popular anxieties of the age in a
way that is rare for a book in legal and political theory. My argument, then, is not a naïve one. Liberal societies face serious
problems. Popular trust in liberal institutions, norms, and practices is low and declining.219 Leaders often seem incapable of, or
uninterested in, offering a vision or a plan that interrupts the
narratives of decline and distrust.220 Rising income inequality is
hollowing out a middle class, leading many on the left and right to
question whether liberalism’s free market is worth trying to
save.221 And there is increasing evidence to demonstrate Americans lack the type of relationships—whether from family, church,
218
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or even the local bowling league222—where meaning and purpose
are cultivated.
Though admittedly depressing, the evidence post-fusionists
marshal to prove liberalism’s failure is still subject to interpretation. Will our great-grandchildren view the early twenty-first
century as the moment when liberalism breathed its last gasps
before being replaced by other legal and political orders? Or will
our great-grandchildren look back at our time as one that tested
the durability, flexibility, and viability of liberalism, but from
which liberalism emerged, perhaps even stronger? We do not
know.223 The Owl of Minerva only takes flight at dusk.224 I have
attempted to argue, however, that although there are reasons for
pessimism, there are also signs and sources of hope, often rooted
in law, that critics like Deneen generally avoid or misunderstand.
Not only is there a principled case to be made regarding
liberalism’s capacity for survival, but there are also very practical
aspects to consider when contemplating liberalism’s health and
viability. If liberalism has died—but whatever is to follow has not
yet been born—where does that leave those of us who inhabit
(formerly) liberal societies?
If the demise of liberalism, the dominant sociopolitical legal
system of our time, is inevitable, what are we to do? And what will
take liberalism’s place in a world where exposure to diverse ways
of life—which helped prompt liberalism’s initial rise—is only
increasing?
Various critiques of Deneen have noted—and he has generally
conceded225—that his plans and predictions for what follows
liberalism are vague, at best, and his guidance no clearer for how
citizens are to conduct themselves in this period of transition.226
In an effort to empower disillusioned citizens, Deneen proposes a
turn inward and away from public life,227 but it is far from clear
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what the positive impact of that would be. If anything, an inward
turn could make the present divides in liberal societies even greater and the quest for the common good only more elusive.
Rather than turning inward and giving up on liberalism and
the prospect of seeking a common good amidst diversity, why not
interpret the current moment as an opportunity to use our associations and institutions to address some of the deficiencies
liberalism’s critics have identified? The question seems especially
relevant for those institutions and professions that have at various
times and in various ways been caretakers of the public good. In
these final pages, I briefly outline some of the ways that legal
education and the legal profession have contributed to the crisis of
legitimacy facing liberalism’s law, and I begin to sketch a way
forward.
B. Law, Virtue, and the Public Good
There is an all-too-familiar story of decline regarding the legal
profession, a story in which lawyers were once statesmen who
embodied virtues of integrity, justice, and courage but who have
fallen prey to various social, market, and professional forces in
recent generations.228
Law students, according to this story of decline, still sometimes enroll in law school for seemingly noble reasons but find
themselves subject to forces that seem largely out of their control
and end up choosing career paths very different from what led
them to law school in the first place.229 These students become
lawyers who feel compelled to bracket their own values from their
work and to set aside questions of meaning, purpose, and the
common good in favor of a professional identity rooted primarily,
if not exclusively, in zealous representation of one’s clients.230 All
too often these lawyers go on to become unhappy, if not depressed,
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addicted, or suicidal, all the while the profession itself loses whatever credibility it had with the public.231
Legal education is often blamed for contributing to, if not
creating, a lawyerly mindset that not only leads to various unhealthy social and personal outcomes but that also embodies some
of the worst features of liberalism, including the alienation of one’s
self from one’s ends and a form of consumerist individualism that
leaves little room for considerations of personal virtue or social
good.232
One response to the mounting evidence of the profession’s
decline would be to conclude that law, like liberalism,
has failed—not because it fell short, but because it was true to
itself. It has failed because it has succeeded. As [law] has
“become more fully itself,” as its inner logic has become more
evident and its self-contradictions manifest, it has generated
pathologies that are at once deformations of its claims yet
realizations of [law’s] ideology.233

But this conclusion, like Deneen’s regarding liberalism’s failure,
fails to account for sources and resources internal to law that can
be channeled to resist some of these less healthy trends and
developments.
It is well documented that law students often enroll in law
school for reasons that seem to have very little to do with their jobs
after graduation.234 This is not necessarily a problem, in and of
itself, but it presently reflects the ways in which law students, and
the law generally, often lack a clear telos. As the profession has
come to understand itself primarily in terms of service to clients,
its self-understanding has increasingly focused on competence
rather than character, and on serving clients rather than promoting some vision of the public good—a vision that is admittedly
elusive at times. It is striking, for example, how little attention is
paid to justice—as an individual virtue or as an orienting,
collective vision—in legal education and in the profession.235 If law
231
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students and lawyers are not constrained by or oriented toward
justice, they will understand legal reform in incrementalistic
terms, if at all, and will lack a sense of personal or professional
agency in effecting social change.236 This incrementalistic, statusquo conception of law works in tandem with a judicial-centric
vision of legal education, what Robert Cover would call “world
maintaining,”237 that conceives the work of the lawyer as concerned primarily with making the “right” argument to a judge
rather than using law, in concert with one’s fellow citizens, to
establish, maintain, and pursue the community’s vision.238 Law
creates as well as contains, but legal education typically focuses
more on law’s role as a mechanism for social coordination rather
than as a tool for social transformation or the realization of justice.
One of the ever-present risks of law, as a discipline, is that its
focus on neutrality will alienate it from the particularity that it
must navigate. Law must be impartial and impersonal, if it is to
be fair, but, if it loses all cognizance of the human element in which
it operates, it will risk losing its relevance and legitimacy in the
eyes of those whom it serves. The human element of law is of
course taking on new salience with the rise of artificial intelligence
and machine learning.239 Many of the tasks historically performed
by entry-level associates are already being done by machines, and,
if predictions are to be believed, even more law-related jobs will be
taken over by robots in the coming years.240 This makes it all the
more imperative that legal education take seriously virtues such
as wisdom and justice in the training of future lawyers. Legal
education and the legal profession will increasingly be required to
articulate a value proposition that extends beyond technical competency and that implicates an ethical register.
Four distinct but related charges emerge from these observations. Law schools and the legal profession must: (1) engage both
236
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individual and profession-wide questions of meaning and purpose
more fully; (2) provide instruction in the skills needed to be an
excellent lawyer but also the virtues and character traits required
to be a successful and fulfilled lawyer who understands her relationship to the broader public; (3) keep in mind Madison’s admonition that “[j]ustice is the end of government”241 and that law is
the chief instrument in realizing that end; and (4) recognize that
lawyers have distinct opportunities and obligations to uphold the
public good in a liberal democracy, including with respect to
cultivating and modeling self-government.
There are no doubt principled as well as practical reasons to
be skeptical of these suggestions regarding legal education and the
legal profession. Some might argue, for example, that my admonitions are naïve in that they fail to understand the social and
market dynamics of contemporary legal practice. Others might
insist that this values-and-vision approach is not bad in and of
itself, but that it belongs in a school of theology or philosophy
rather than a school of law tasked with developing certain core
competencies. Focusing on these matters in law school would
inevitably result in omitting other, essential instruction. Others
might insist that talk of values and vision presents not just
logistical challenges but principled ones as well. If law schools
engage in the domain of virtues and values, do they not risk
elevating some conceptions of the good and denigrating others? If
law orients students and practitioners toward some vision of the
good, what about those who hold other visions? Still others might
simply ask if law school occurs too late in the lives of students to
shape their values in any meaningful way.
These critiques reflect the same sorts of sentiments expressed
by liberals who fail to take seriously the types of concerns Deneen
raises. The fact is that legal education and the legal profession
cannot avoid engaging questions of meaning, purpose, and identity
any more easily than liberalism. Law schools socialize students in
deep and numerous ways whether or not law schools recognize
that they are doing so. The question is in what ways—not whether—
values will be engaged and character formed. Furthermore, the
wellbeing of lawyers, the profession, and the broader public depends on institutional leaders who can channel the virtue of
courage in responding to current pressures. Liberalism’s persistence is not inevitable, but it is possible if the institutions and
241
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associations upon which the health of liberal democracy depends
recognize and respond to changing needs.
VI. CONCLUSION
While Deneen and the post-fusionists are too quick to conclude
that liberalism’s failure is inevitable, they are right to note that
liberalism’s persistence is not foreordained.242 If liberalism is to
persist, which I believe it can, it will not be because of an inevitable
march of history but instead because of the dedicated efforts of
individuals and groups from the political left and right who
recognize the value of liberalism even while acknowledging its
limitations. I have argued that liberal practices, including law,
should be distinguished from liberal theory; that liberal law
reflects and facilitates meaning-making, cultivation of virtue, and
pursuit of the common good in ways that Deneen and the postfusionists overlook; and that, as a result, the story of the
inevitable—or already complete—death of liberalism is misguided.
And I have briefly sketched what reform efforts might look like for
legal education and the legal profession to perform the mediating
functions required by institutions needed in the distinctive context
of America’s liberal democracy. Law and legal education are, of
course, not the only institutions in need of engaging meaning,
virtue, and the common good. For liberalism to persist, various
associations, institutions, and professions must acknowledge the
dearth of trust in American society, especially towards institutions, and think creatively about implementing reforms that
recognize broader social needs as well as the distinctive opportunities those associations and institutions have for reorienting
themselves in ways that will conduce to the benefit of those
particular institutions as well as for the common good. While
liberalism’s diagnosis of bad health is not without conceptual,
anecdotal, and empirical evidence, it is premature to call the
coroner.
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